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U.C.C. SECTION 9-504 SALES BY JUNIOR SECURED 
PARTIES: IS A SENIOR PARTY ENTITLED TO NOTICE 
AND PROCEEDS? 
Cynthia Starnes· 
The Uniform Commercial Code! is in a state of tremendous up-
heaval. The recent revision of Articles 3 and 4, the promulgation of 
Articles 2A and 4A, and the slating of Articles 2 and 9 for revision, 
evidence a broad commitment to rethinking the law of commercial 
transactions. It is a time to break stride and to assess the effects of 
advancing technology, changing commercial practice, and encroaching 
federal legislation. It is also a time to address nagging problems that 
have surfaced under old law. 
One such nagging problem has arisen under the current Article 9 
rules on, default sales. Section 9-504, the cornerstone of the Code rules 
on default, produces curious results when applied to sales by junior se-
cured parties. In some circumstances, section 9-504(3) permits a junior 
secured party to repossess collateral from a defaulting debtor and sell it 
without informing the senior secured party. This possibility seems to be 
the product of drafting oversight rather than design. 2 Moreover, section 
9-504(1) authorizes a foreclosing junior party to retain the proceeds of 
sale without accounting to a senior party, even if the senior party was 
unaware of the sale. Courts,3 commentators! and practitioners6 ad-
• Associate Professor of Law, 'Detroit College of Law. J.D. 1983. Indiana Univer-
sity-Indianapolis; LL.M. 1989. Columbia University. I want to thank my former professor. Don-
ald Rapson. whose enthusiasm inspired my initial interest in this topic. He kindly read an earlier 
draft of this article. as did Ron Cuming. E. Allan F~rnsworth and William Hawkland. This Arti-
cle is much the better for all their comments~ Homer Kripke also read an earlier draft and re-
sponded with an abundance of very helpful suggestions. for which I am most grateful. I am also 
indebted to my colleague. Kathy Payne. for her insightful answers to my many queries. My thanks 
also go to Mark Wright for his research assista,nce par excellence. 
I. Unless otherwise indicated. all references and citations are to the 1978 official text of the 
Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter the Code]. 
2. See infra note 44. 
3. See infra notes 73-140 and accompanying text. 
4. Over the last year. this problem has been the topic of numerous letters exchanged among 
William Hawkland. Homer Kripke. and Donald Rapson. It was also the topic of a memorandum 
from Homer Kripke to the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code. These 
letters and the memorandum are on file in the library of the Detroit. College of Law. 
5. See Letter from Donald Rapson to Homer Kripke (Aug. 16. 1989) (on file at the Detroit 
563 
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dressing this issue have been hard-pressed to find satisfactory Code di-
rection in either text or policy. Recently, the situation has been brought 
to the attention of the Article 9 Study Committee. 
This Article will briefly e,xplain the context in which the problem 
arises, detail the operation of section 9-504,6 explore relevant Code 
goals and policies, appraise possible solutions, and, finally, propose an 
amendment to section 9-504. This effort is made in the modest hope of 
eliminating one old and nagging problem, and of contributing to the 
successful revision of Article 9. 
I. THE PROBLEM 
A. Options of the Secured Party on Default of the Debtor 
The starting point for any examination of default rules should be a 
definition of "default." The term, however, has no uniform meaning. 
The Code does not define it,7 leaving this task to the parties8 or to "any 
scraps of common law lying around."9 Essentially, "default is whatever 
the parties say it is."lo Typically, a security agreement will provide 
that, in addition to nonpayment, the following actions of the debtor 
constitute default:ll (1) a material misrepresentation made for the pur-
pose of obtaining the loan; (2) a failure to properly insure the collat-
eral; (3) a failure to properly maintain the collateral; or (4)any volun-
tary or involuntary transfer of the collateral. 
Once a debtor's default has been established, a secured party has 
several options. 12 First, it may employ any remedies provided by the 
College of Law Library). 
6. For an examination of the effects of the more general provisions of § 9-311 on this prob-
lem, see Byrne, Murphy & Vukowich, Junior Creditors' Realization on Debtors' Equity Under 
u.e.e. Section 9-311: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 77 GEO. L.J. 1905 (1989). 
7. See the Official Comment to §2A-527 which adds to the obscurity of the term by postu-
lating a somewhat dubious distinction between a "default" and an "event .of default" under a 
lease agreement. U.C.C. § 2A-527 official comment (1978). 
8. U.C.C. § 9-201 states the general Code rule that a security agreement is effective ac-
cording to its terms between the parties. U.C.C. § 9-201 (1978). 
9. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-2 (1988). See U.C.C. § 1-
103 which provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of 
law and equity ... shall supplement its provisions." U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978). 
10. 2 G. GILMORE. SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 43.3, at 1193 (1965). 
II. See Riegert, Secured Transactions Part Ill, 89 COM. L.J. 127, 131 (1984). The content 
of default clauses, of course, will vary depending on the circumstances of the transaction and the 
foresight of drafting attorneys. For a more exhaustive list of events typically constituting default, 
see B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 11 
4.02(1) (2ded.1988). -
12. See Annotation, Construction and Effect of U.e.e. Art. 9, Dealing with Secured Trans-
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security agreement to the extent that these remedies do not conflict 
with· Code provisions.ls Second, the secured party may use any non-
Code judicial procedures provided by state law.u State procedures vary 
but commonly provide for levy and execution or foreclosure on the col-
lateral, which may be followed by judicial sale. 111 Third, the secured 
party may choose the Code's own remedies. Section 9-503 authorizes a 
secured party to take possession of the collateral without judicial pro-
cess if it can do so without breaching the peace. lS If the secured party 
cannot seize the collateral quietly, it must seek judicial authority as, for 
example, in an action for replevin.17 
If the secured party repossesses the collateral, either through self-
help or judicial process, it has two further options. Section 9-505 gener-
actions. Sales of Accounts~ Contract Rights and Chattel Paper, 30 A.L.R.3d § 22.9, at 131 
(Supp. 1988) (collection of cases dealing with the remedies of a secured party after debtor's 
default). 
13. .U .C.C. § 9-50 I (I) provides in part: "When a debtor is in default under a security 
agreement, a secured party has the rights and remedies provided in this part and except as limited 
by subsection (3) those provided in the security agreement." U.C.C. § 9-501(1) (1978). 
See also U.C.C. § 9-504(3) which precludes a secured party from waiving or varying rights of 
the debtor or duties of the secured party except as allowed in Part 5. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1978). 
For a criticism of these restrictions, see 2 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION 
REPORT. HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 113 (1954) (comment of Louis A. 
Russo) (complaining that "the rigidity of this section would destroy, almost completely, freedom 
of contract as to remedies on default"); but cf observation of Professor Gilmore: "Despite the 
considerable amount of wordage, however, Part 5, rejecting the [Uniform Conditional Sales Act] 
approach of detailed statutory regulation, opts for a loosely organized, informal, anything-goes 
type of foreclosure pattern, subject to ultimate judicial supervision and control which is explicitly 
provided for." G. GILMORE, supra note 10, § 43.1, atll83. 
14. U .C.C. § 9-50 I (I) authorizes a secured party to "reduce his claim to judgment, fore-
close or otherwise enforce the security interest by any available judicial procedure." U.C.C. § 9-
501(1) (1978). 
15. Riegert, supra note II, at 128. Judicial process sometimes has the advantage of al-
lowing the secured party to levy on other assets of the debtor in addition to the collateral, an 
important consequence when the collateral is insufficient to. satisfy the obligation. For a discussion 
of a secured party's in personam action on the debt, see B. CLARK, supra note 11,11 4.03[2]. 
16. U.C.C. § 9-503 provides: 
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the 
collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this 
can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action. If the security agree-
ment so provides the secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and 
make it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured party 
which is reasonably convenient to both parties. Without removal a secured party may 
render equipment unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under 
§ 9-504. 
V.C.C. § 9-503 (1978). 
17. For a discussion of the options of a secured party seeking to repossess by judicial action, 
see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 25-7. 
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ally empowers the secured party to retain the collateral in satisfaction 
of the outstanding balance due on the debt,18 Alternatively, section 9-
504 allows the secured party to sell the collateral and apply the pro-
ceeds of sale to the balance due on the obligation. This latter option is 
the most popular choice of secured parties.19 
B. The Section 9-504 Sale 
Section 9-504 grants the secured creditor great latitude in fashion-
ing the circumstances of a default sale. Subsection (1) broadly autho-
rizes a secured party to "sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of 
the collateral in its then condition or following any commercially rea-
sonable preparation or processing."20 Subsection (3) of 9-50421 imposes 
only two restrictions on the foreclosing party: (1) every aspect of the 
sa]e must be commercially reasonable; and (2) the secured party must 
notify the debtor22 and any other secured party from whom it has re-
ceived written notice of an interest in the collatera1.2s 
Proceeds of sale are to be distributed according to the following 
18. The secured party may retain the collateral only if the debtor fails to object in writing 
to the secured party's intention to retain it or, in certain cases involving consumer goods, only if 
the debtor after default signs a written statement waiving or modifying its rights under Part 5 of 
Article 9. U.c.c. § 9-505 (1978). 
19. B. CLARK, supra note II, 11 4.06. See also comment of Professor Gilmore: "Sale of the 
collateral is, always has been and always will be the normal default procedure." G. GILMORE, 
supra note 10, § 44.6, at 1238. 
20. U.c.c. § 9-504( I) (1978). 
21. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) provides: 
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may be made by 
way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and 
at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition including the 
method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral 
is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a 
recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or rea-
sonable notification of the time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is 
to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor if he has not signed after 
default a statement renouncing or modifying his right to notification of sale. In the case of 
consumer goods no other notification need be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent 
to any other secured party from whom the secured party has received (before sending his 
notification to the debtor or before the debtor's renunciation of his rights) written notice of 
a chiim of an interest in the collateral. The secured par.ty may buy at any public sale and if 
the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a type which is 
the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations he may buy at private sale. 
U.c.c. § 9-504(3) (\978) ... 
22. Such notice need not be given to a debtor who, after default, signed a statement re-
nouricing or modifying its right to notice. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1978). 
23. If the collateral is consumer goods, notice to other secured parties is not required. [d. 
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order of priority: (1) reasonable expenses of sale;24 (2) satisfaction of 
the indebtedness of the foreclosing party;25 and (3) satisfaction of any 
subordinate security interest.26 The default sale discharges the security 
interest of the foreclosing party and any subordinate security interest.27 
Operating in tandem, the notice and proceeds provisions of section 
9-504 produce curious results when a junior party forecloses on 
collateral. 
1. Notice to Other Secured Parties 
The notice provision of section 9-504(3) has an interesting history .. 
The 1952 official text of this section required notice to any other se-
cured party "who has filed a financing statement."28 Early on, this sim-
ple requirement was challenged as unduly burdening foreclosing par-
ties. 29 Arguably, a secured party could satisfy this notice requirement· 
24. U.c.c. § 9-504(1 )(a) states that proceeds shall·be applied to "the reasonable expenses 
oC retaking, holding, preparing for sale or lease, selling, leasing and the like and, to the extent 
provided for in the agreement and not prohibited by law, the reasonable attorneys' fees and legal 
expenses incurred by the secured party." U.c.c. § 9-504(1 )(a) (1978). 
25. U.c.c. § 9-504(1)(b) states that proceeds shall be applied to "the satisfaction of in-
debtedness.secured by the security interest under which the disposition is made." U.c.c. § 9-
504( I )(b) (1978). 
26. U.c.c. § 9-504(1 )(c) provides that proceeds shall be applied to 
the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate security interest in the collat-
eral if written notification of demand therefor is received before distribution of the proceeds 
is completed. If requested by the secured party, the holder of a subor~inate security inter-
est must seasonably furnish reasonable proof of his interest, and unless he does so, the 
secured party need not comply with his demand. 
U.C.C. § 9-504(I)(c) (1978). 
27. U.C.C. § 9-504(4) provides: 
When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the disposition transfers to 
a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights therein, discharges the security interest 
under which it is made and any security interest or lien subordinate thereto. The purchaser 
takes free of all such rights and interests .even though the secured party' fails to comply 
with the requirements of this i>art or of any judicial proceedings . 
(a) in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no knowledge of any 
defects in. the sale and if he does not buy in collusion with the secured 
party, other bidders or. the person conducting the sale; or 
(b) in any· other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith. 
U.C.c. § 9-504(4) (1978). 
28. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) . (1952 Official Text). See also U.C.C. § 8-604(2) (Sept. 1949 
Draft) (requiring pre-sale notice to "any person having a publicly filed security interest in the 
same collateral"). 
29. During the 1954 hearings before the New York Law Review .Commission, a bank repre-
sentative objected that this notice requirement imposed an "entirely unwarranted burden" <;m fore-
closing secured parties. See 2 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT. HEAR-
INGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1116 (1954). 
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only by "searching in every filing place in every state where a financing 
statement might be filed relating to the collateral."3o In response to this 
concern, Professor Gilmore suggested "restricting the Code provision 
on who gets notice to security interests on file in this state, avoiding 
thus the possible nightmare of a cross-country check of the files."31. The 
1958 and 1962 official texts of section 9-504(3) apparently adopted 
Professor Gilmore's suggestion, requiring notice to secured parties who 
have filed a financing statement "in this state."32 Ambiguity remained, 
however, as to what type of search requirement this new language im-
posed since it was unclear which state was meant by "this" state.33 
The 1972 amendment to section 9-504(3) abandoned the notic;m 
that a foreclosing party must search out other secured parties with in-
terests in the collateral. Under the 1972 text, a foreclosing party's only 
obligation is to notify "any other secured party from whom the secured 
party has received written notice of a claim of an interest in the collat-
30. [d. 
3 I. [d. at 1174-75 (emphasis added). 
32. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1958 Official Text) and U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (Official Text 
1962). The 1962 text provided: 
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may be 
made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in 
parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition 
including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable. 
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type cus-
tomarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any 
public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or other 
intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor, and 
except in the case of consumer goods to any other person who has a security interest in the 
collateral and who has duly filed a financing statement indexed in the name of the debtor 
in this state or who is known by the secured party to have a security interest in the collat-
eral. The secured party may buy at any public sale and if the collateral is of a type custom-
arily sold in a recognized market or is of a type which is the subject of widely distributed 
standard price quotations he may buy at private sale. 
U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1962). 
The 1952, 1958 and 1962 texts of § 9-504(3) also required the foreclosing party to notify any 
other secured party "who is known by the secured party to have a security interest in the collat-
eral." Such a requirement tends to encourage litigation over the particular facts which might or 
.might not establish that a secured party is "known." For this reason, it was wisely deleted from 
the 1972 draft. 
The 1962 text also created a new exception to the notice requirement in the case of consumer 
goods. This exemption was proposed by the Permanent Editorial Board in its 1956 recommenda-
tions to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The Board explained, 
"the changes also eliminate notification to any other secured party when consumer goods are sold 
because there normally is no such other secured party." U.C.C. § 9-504 (3) (1956 Recommenda-
tions of the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code). 
33. ~ee infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 569 1990-1991
1991] SALES BY JUNIOR SECURED PARTIES 569 
eral. "34 In effect, the 1972 text reverses the parties' roles. Foreclosing 
parties need not search out and notify other secured parties; rather, 
other secured parties must search out and notify potential foreclosing 
parties. 311 
a. Notice to Junior Parties 
When applied to foreclosures by senior parties, the 1972 amend-
ment seems reasonable. From a practical perspective, requiring a senior 
party to go through the motions of searching for subordinate parties 
often was a meaningless gesture, because the likelihood was slim that 
such subordinate parties would receive any proceeds from the senior 
sale. Secured parties are often undercollateralized. Satisfaction of the 
senior interest therefore often depletes the sale proceeds, leaving noth-
ing for the junior party. In the words of the drafters; "there would 
seldom be a junior secured party who really had an interest needing 
protection."36 Consequently, any burden on the senior party, including 
a search requirement, seemed unreasonable. 
The search requirement of the 1962 rule seemed especially objec-
tionable to senior parties with purchase money security interests37 in 
equipment. These parties complained that while the Code granted them 
special priority without requiring a search of the records at the incep-
tion of the transaction, section 9-504(3) lumped them together with all 
other secured parties in imposing a search requirement at the time of 
foreclosure. As one 1972 drafter explained, "there were strong com-
plaints by holders of purchase money security interests with priority on 
equipment. ... We eliminated the notice requirement because these 
purchase money security interests on equipment are probably the most 
numerous single category of Article 9 transactions."38 
34. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1978). 
35. For an argument that the 1972 amendment to § 9-504(3) unconstitutionally deprives a 
junior secured party of an interest in property without due process, see Rappaport, The Constitu-
tionality of Section 9-504(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Question of State Action and 
Procedural Due Process, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 497 (1984). 
36. U.C.C. § 9-504 app. (Official Statement of Reasons for 1972 Changes in Official Text) 
( 1972). 
37. U.C.C. § 9-107.provides: 
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent that it is (a) taken 
or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price; or (b) taken by a 
person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value to enable the debtor 
to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value is in fact so used. 
U.C.C. § 9-107 (1978). 
38. Memorandum from Homer Kripke to Members of the Permanent Editorial Board for 
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b. Notice to Senior Parties 
The 1972 notice rule seems reasonable when applied to sales by 
senior secured parties, it produces troublesome results when applied to 
sales by junior secured parties. In application, the 1972 rule means that 
a secured party will receive notice of a sale only if that party was previ-
ously aware of the interest of the foreclosing party. Senior parties, how-
ever, may often be unaware of junior interests in the collateral because 
their priority does not depend on the identification of such interests.39 
Senior parties thus may not have sent notice of their interest to junior 
parties, and therefore will not receive notice of a junior foreclosure. 
Senior parties with either ordinary security interests or purchase money 
security interests in equipment are the most likely to be unaware of 
junior interests. The Code priority rules account for their ignorance. 
Generally, the Code gives priority to the first to file or perfect a 
security interest.'o In the case of an ordinary perfected security interest 
in inventory or equipment, the senior party's priority stems from its 
first filing. This party has no reason to search the records subsequent to 
filing, since its priority does not depend on identification of subse-
quently filed security interests. Thus, parties whose priority stems from 
a first filing may be unaware of junior interests in the same collateral. 
The Code also gives priority to a purchase money security interest 
in equipment (or other non-inventory collateral).41 Such a security in-
terest outranks a conflicting ordinary security interest with. an after-
acquired property clause. The Code imposes no notice requirement on 
the purch.ase money secured party, i.e., the secured party's priority is 
the U.C.C. (July 27, 1989) (on file at the the Detroit College of Law Library). 
39. The senior party may receive notice, however, pursuant t.o the terms of the security 
agreement. For example, the senior security agreement may require the debtor to notify the senior 
party immediately upon receipt of any notice of foreclosure against the collateral. If a debtor 
failed to meet this duty, a senior party might have a claim against the debtor for resulting dam-
ages. The value of such a claim, however, is questionable given the debtor's precarious financial 
condition which probably prompted its default. Similarly, a senior party may have insisted upon a 
clause in the security agreement which forces any junior secured party to obtain the senior's con-
sent before foreclosing. The validity of such agreements is recognized by the broad language of 
U.c.c. § 9-201 (1978). 
40. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1978). The first-to-file rule means simply that the first se-
cured party to file a financing statement or perfect the security interest has priority over other 
secured parties. The primary exception to the first-to-file rule is the purchase money security in-
terest, which is given special priority under §§ 9-312(3) and 9-312(4). U.c.c. §§ 9-312(3)-(4) 
(1978). For a more detailed explanation of the first-to-file rule, see B. CLARK, supra note II. . 
41. See U.C.C. § 9-312(4) (1978). This priority depends on perfection of the purchase 
money security interest at the time the debtor receives possession or within ten days thereafter. 
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not contingent on its notice to any secured parties it subordinates. Con-
sequently, a purchase money secured party might reasonably rely on its 
purchase money priority without checking the records for any ordinary 
security interest necessarily junior to its own. These secured parties 
may therefore be unaware of the existence of junior interests in the 
same collatera1.42 . 
Interestingly, the 1972 drafters seem to have overlooked the possi-
bility that a senior secured party might not receive notice of a junior 
party's sale. The drafters' explanation for the 1972 amendment to sec-
tion 9-504(3) focuses exclusively on the value of notice to a junior se-
cured party, suggesting a failure to consider sales by a junior party.43 
In fact, this oversight has recently be.en frankly acknowledged.44 
Despite the drafters' lack of intent to do so, the practical effect of 
the 1972 Code revision is to impose new and onerous burdens on senior 
parties when a junior party forecloses. In order to ensure notice of a 
junior party's foreclosure, senior parties must check the records-not 
once, but habitually-in search of new subordinate security interests. 
Such a duty of constant policing defeats one goal of the filing system, 
which is to eliminate the need for subsequent checking once a security 
interest is recorded. Unless the senior party meets its burden of con-
stant diligence, it might not be informed of an impending sale and 
might thus be deprived of an opportunity to intervene.4C! The problem 
of the uninformed senior secured party is exacerbated by the provisions 
of section 9-504( 1) directing distribution of the proceeds of sale. 
42. The same problem does not occur in cases of a general inventory security interest and 
one or more conflicting inventory purchase money security interests. In these cases, each secured 
party should be aware of the other because the Code hinges purchase money priority on notice to 
conflicting interest holders. The priority rules thus ensure that a senior secured party will be 
aware of a junior interest. See U.c.c. § 9-312(3) (1978). 
43. The drafters explained the change as follows: "These burdens of searching the record 
and of checking the secured party's files were greater than the circumstances called for because as 
a practical matter there would seldom be a junior secured party· who really had an interest need-
ing protection in the case of a foreclosure sale." U.C.C. § 9-504 app. (1972) (Official Statement 
for Reasons for 1972 Changes in Official Text). 
44. "[W)e did not deliberately, by knocking out the requirement of notice to parties of 
record, intend to delete a notice from a junior party to a senior secured party that the junior was 
foreclosing. To be frank about it, we never thought about this problem of juniors foreclosing." 
Memorandum of Homer Kripke, supra note 38. In fairness to the 1972 drafters, there were few, if 
any, significant pre-1972 cases involving junior foreclosures. 
45. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ways in which an 
informed senior secured party could intervene to protect its interests. 
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2. Distribution of Proceeds of. Sale 
. The earliest drafts of the Code directed that default sale proceeds 
should be applied to reasonable expenses of sale, and then to "the in-
debtedness. ".6 The debtor was entitled to any surplus and was liable 
for any deficiency.·' The September 1950 revisions replaced this simple 
rule with the following explicit order of distribution: (1) reasonable ex-
penses of sale;48 (2) satisfaction of any senior security interest or lien;·& 
(3) satisfaction of the foreclosing party's security interest;IiO and (4) 
satisfaction of any subordinate security interest.lil As in earlier drafts, 
the debtor was entitled to any surplus and liable for any deficiency.1i2 
Interestingly, the final draft proposed in the Spring of 1951 myste-
riously deleted the senior secured party from the list of those entitled to 
share in sale proceeds. The 1951 draft stated the following order of 
distribution: (1) reasonable expenses of sale; (2) satisfaction of fore-
46. See u.c.c. § 8-604(1) (Sept. 1949 Draft) which stated: 
A secured lender may realize on his collateral by selling any or all of it (as is or following 
preparation) and after application of the proceeds of sale to the reasonable expenses of 
retaking, holding, preparing for sale and selling and to the satisfaction of the indebtedness, 
he has a right to any deficiency but must account to the borrower for any surplus. 
See also U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (Spring 1950 Proposed Final Draft) which provided: 
A secured lender may realize on his collateral by selling any or all of it in its then condition 
or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing. After application of 
the proceeds of sale to reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale and 
selling and to satisfaction of the indebtedness, he has a right to any deficiency but must 
account to the debtor for any surplus. 
47. See supra note 46. 
48. U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(a) (Sept. 1950 Revision) provided that proceeds should be applied 
to "the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale, selling and the like to the 
extent the recovery thereof is not prohibited by law or agreement." 
49. U.C.C. § 9-504(1 )(b) (Sept. 1950 revision) stated that proceeds should be applied to 
the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any security interest or lien having priority over 
the security interest under which the disposition is made unless with the consent of the 
owner of such prior interest or lien the disposition is made specifically subject thereto or 
unless such owner refuses to accept such proceeds. 
50. U.C.C. § 9-504(1 )(c) (Sept. 1950 Revision) provided that proceeds should be applied to 
"the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security interest under which the disposition is 
made." 
51. U.C.C. § 9-504(I)(d) (Sept. 1950 Revision) provided that proceeds should be applied 
to "the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate security interest in the collateral if 
written notification of demand therefor is received before distribution of the proceeds is 
completed." 
52. The last sentence of U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (Sept. 1950 Revision) provided: "The secured 
lender must account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is 
liable for any deficiency." 
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closing party's security interest; and (3) satisfaction of any subordinate 
security interest.1I8 
The 1952 official draft of section 9-504(1) also made no provision 
for a senior secured party to recover sale proceeds.1i4 The failure of the 
1952 draft to protect the interest of a senior secured party did not go 
unnoticed. During the 1954 hearings of the New York Law Revision 
Commission, a bank objected that "[a] further source of controversy 
and difficulty may be noted in that the provisions regarding application 
of excess proceeds speak only of subordinate security interests, not of 
equal or prior security interests."1i1i In their 1955 report; the Commis-
sion responded that "[a]pparently, disposal by a subordinate secured 
party will be subject to the senior secured party."1i6 The Commission's 
reasoning seemed to be that, unlike a subordinate interest which is dis-
charged by sale, a senior interest survives sale and thus gives a senior 
party a post-sale interest in the collateral. Arguably, a senior party 
therefore is adequately protected after sale, and should not be forced to 
take an early pay-out on what may be a satisfactory investment.1I7 In 
contrast, because a junior security interest is discharged by the sale, 
that party's recovery against the collateral depends on its ability to 
claim sale proceeds. Indeed, the drafters explained the subordinate se-
cured party's right to proceeds by citing the discharge of that party's 
interest.1i8 
The section 9-504 proceeds distribution rules of the 1958, 1962 
53. Like earlier drafts, the 1951 revision conditioned a subordinate party's recovery on its 
written demand before distribution of proceeds. It also entitled the debtor to any surplus and 
made it liable for any deficiency. See U.C.C. § 9-504(I)(c) (Spring 1951 Proposed Final Draft). 
54. The 1952 text carried over the general rule entitling the debtor to any surplus, and 
making it liable for any deficiency, but created a new exception in cases of sales of investments, 
accounts, contract rights or chattel paper. In these cases, a debtor was entitled to any surplus only 
if the security agreement so provided. See U.C.C. § 9-504(l)(c) (1952 Official Text). 
55. 2 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT. HEARINGS ON THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1114-15 (1954). (Comment of L. Russo) 
56. 3 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT. STUDY OF THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 2076 (1955). 
57. For a discussion of the rights of a senior secured party following a junior sale see infra 
notes 98-140 and accompanying text. 
58. Comment 2 to § 9-504 (3) provides: 
Under [9-504(1 )(c)], the secured party, after paying expenses of retaking and disposition 
and his own debt, is required to pay over remaining proceeds to the extent necessary to 
satisfy the holder of any junior security interest in the same collateral if the holder of the 
junior interest has made a written demand: this provision is necessary in view of the fact 
that under [9·504(3)] the junior interest is discharged by the disposition. 
U.C.C. § 9-504(3) comment 2 (1952 Official Draft). 
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and 1972 official texts closely approximate the 1952 scheme.1I9 None of 
these texts requires or authorizes a selling junior party to turn over sale 
proceeds to a senior party. The earliest drafts of section 9-504 make 
clear that the failure to include any provision entitling a senior secured 
party to sale proceeds was intentional. . 
In addition to the history of section 9-504, the text itself suggests 
that the drafters intended to preclude senior secured parties from tak-
ing sale proceeds. Section 9-504( 1) clearly specifies that only 
"subordinate security interests" are entitled to proceeds. Use of the 
word "subordinate" in section 9-504(1) suggests an effort to distinguish 
interests that are non-subordinate, Le., senior interests.6o In fact, the 
specificity of the order of distribution suggests not only that a junior 
party has no obligation to turn over foreclosure proceeds to a senior 
party, but that the junior is affirmatively prohibited from doing SO.61 
No other Code provision explicitly requires or permits a junior 
party to share or to pay over foreclosure proceeds to a senior party.62 
The senior secured party, however, is not left totally without recqurse; 
its remedy, as the New York Commission suggested, lies against the 
collateral in possession of the foreclosure sale purchaser. 
C. Section 9-504 Postmortem-Remedy for a Disappointed Senio.r 
Secured Party 
The harsh effects of section 9-504 on uninformed senior secured 
parties are somewhat· ameliorated by section 9-306. Subsection (2) of 
that section generally recognizes a secured party's post-sale interest in 
59. Each of these texts improves upon the 1952 provision by (I) specifying that reasonable 
attorneys' fees and legal expenses may be reasonable expenses of sale (9-504(1 )(a)); and (2) au-
thorizing a foreclosing party to demand reasonable proof of a subordinate security interest (9-
504(1)(c)). 
60. This conclusion draws upon the rule of statutory construction: "expressio unius est ex-
c1usio alterius"-the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of the other. 
61. See Letter from William D. Hawkland to Homer Kripke (June 20, 1989) (the Detroit 
College of Law Library) ("9-504 mandates an order of distribution that does not require (or even 
permit) a junior secured party to account to a senior secured party with respect to foreclosure 
proceeds .... ") At least one court has held that a foreclosing secured party may not voluntarily 
share proceeds with a senior secured party, as to do so would injure guarantors of the debt being 
foreclosed. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Tectamar, Inc., 33 N.C. App. 604, 235 S.E.2d 894 (1977). 
But cf Consolidated Equip. Sales v. First Bank & Trust, 627 P.2d 432 (Okla. 1981) (holding that 
a junior party is liable for conversion if it fails to share proceeds with a senior party). On this 
I_atter point, see infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
62. See infra notes 108-20 and accompanying text for an argument that other Code sec-
tions, especially § 9-306(2), require a junior secured party to account to the senior party. 
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both the collateral and the identifiable proceeds of sale. Section 9.-
306(2) states: 
Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in col-
lateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the dis-
position was authorized by the secured party in' the agreement or otherwise and 
continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by a debtor. 
1: A Right to the Collateral 
Section 9-306(2) clearly indicates that unless the senior party au-
thorizes the sale, its interest follows the collateral into the hands of the 
foreclosure sale purchaser.6s Thus, the senior has a post-sale claim to 
the collateral. If the purchaser were unable or unwilling to surrender 
the collateral, it would be liable to the senior party for conv·ersion.64 ' 
Nothing in section 9-504 suggests an intent to alter the collateral 
rule of 9-306(2). Subsection (4) of 9-504 states that disposal of collat-
eral by a secured party after default "transfers to a purchaser for value 
all of the debtor's rights therein, discharges the security interest under 
which it is made and any security interest or lien subordinate 
thereto."6Ci This section explicitly discharges only two types of security 
interests: (1) the interest of the party conducting the sale, and .(2) any 
subordinate security interests. The specificity of the drafters demon-
strates an intent. to .leave intact non-subordinate, i.e., senior security 
interests.66 Thus, these security interests would continue in the collat-
eral as contemplated by 9-306(2). 
Section 9-306(2) also could be interpreted to give a senior secured 
party an interest in sale proceeds collected by a junior secured party. 
63. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1978). The words "other disposition" seem to include an involun-
tary transfer, such as a foreclosure. For a discussion of § 9-306(2) and other Code prov'isions 
supporting the view that a security interest continues in the collateral after an involuntary trans-
fer, see Sortor, Involuntary Transfers Under u.e.e. Section 9-311, 39 Sw. L.J. 709, 730-33 
(1985). 
64. See U.C.C. § 9-306 comment 3 (1978): "("Since the transferee takes subject to the se-
curity interest, the secured party may repossess the collateral from him or in an appropriate case 
maintain an action for conversion."). See also R. HILLMAN. J. McDoNNELL & ~. NICKELS. COM-
MON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 11 25.02[4][c] (1985). 
The secured party, however, cannot sue the purchaser on the debt, since the purchaser does 
not incur the debtor's obligation to repay the debt. See R, HILLMAN. J. McDoNNELL & S, NICK-
ELS,supra note 64, at 11 25.0I[a][b]. 
65. U.C.C. § 9-504(4) (1978). 
66. This inference finds support in the rule of statutory construction: "expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius" -'- the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of the other. 
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This possibility is discussed in Part III.B. of this Article. It is worth 
noting at this point, however, that such a reading of section 9-306(2) 
would conflict with the specific' order of distribution in section 9-
504( 1), which omits a senior party from its list of those entitled to sale 
proceeds. Given the specificity of section 9-504( 1), this section would 
seem to trump the more general rule of 9-306(2).67 In addition, the text 
of section 9-306(2) speaks only to proceeds "received by a debtor," not 
to those received by a junior secured party. 
2. A Hypothetical 
A simple example illustrates the curious and precarious position in 
which the Code leaves a senior secured party after an undisclosed fore-
closure by a junior party. Suppose that Bank loans debtor $50,000 and 
takes an ordinary security interest in debtor's equipment, which is 
worth $100,000. Sometime thereafter, Finance Co. loans debtor 
$20,000 and takes an ordinary security interest in debtor's $50,000 eq-
uity in the same collateral. Bank does not know of the security interest 
of Finance Co., as its priority did not depend on identification of any 
subsequent security interests. Debtor subsequently defaults on its obli-
gation to Finance Co., which swiftly repossesses debtor's equipment 
and sells it to X for $40,000 at a sale that is conducted in a commer-
cially reasonable manner. With the proc~eds, Finance Co. pays the sale 
costs (including fees to its attorney), applies $20,000 to satisfaction of 
its security interest, and, as there are no security interests subordinate 
to its own, returns the remaining funds to debtor. Soon thereafter, 
Bank contacts debtor who has also failed to make scheduled payments 
to Bank. Bank then learns that the collateral has been sold and the 
proceeds distributed without its knowledge. 
Bank will probably be surprised to learn of the sale, and will be 
even more surprised to learn that the conduct of the junior secured 
party does not violate the Code. For the senior secured party crying 
"foul," courts have suggested at least three possible answers: (1) pre-
clude the junior party from selling the collateral; (2) give the senior 
party first priority in sale proceeds; or (3) leave the senior party to its 
remedy against the collateral. The efficacy of each answer should be 
examined in light of the Code's goals and policies. 
67. This conclusion follows from the rule of statutory construction "generalia specialibus 
non derogant"-general words do not derogate from the special. 
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II. GOALS AND POLICY CONCERNS 
The Code's underlying purposes and policies are "(a) to simplify, 
clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; (b) 
to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through cus-
tom, usage and agreement of the parties; (c) to make uniform the law 
among the various jurisdictions. "B8 The specific goal of Article 9 is to 
provide a simple and unified structure for secured transactions which 
maximizes efficiency and certainty.B9 Article 9 promotes these goals in 
part by authorizing and facilitating access to information by those who 
have a legitimate need for it.70 Certainty and efficiency also are pro-
moted by the Code's simple first-to-file rule, which rewards the diligent 
and clarifies the rights of concerned parties.71 Article 9 further reflects 
a policy favoring the free alienability of property rights.72 
The policies of the Code, and of Article 9 in particular, suggest 
five concerns which should direct an analysis of junior party foreclo-
sures. First, a simple and clear rule should be adopted that will provide 
the certainty and uniformity lacking under current law. Such a rule 
should enable a secured party to ascertain its rights readily in reference 
to other secured parties. Second, the expansion of commercial practices 
should be encouraged by avoiding any rule that would be inimical to 
secondary financing. Third, the general Code preference for the first to 
file should be honored. Fourth, economic efficiency should be en-
couraged by adopting procedures likely to maximize the price on resale 
of collateral and minimize the parties' transaction costs. Fifth, the free 
alienability of property should be respected by precluding any party 
from unilaterally vetoing transfer of the collateral. The resolutions of-
68. U.C.c. § 1-102 (1978). Comment I to this section suggests that "each section should 
be read in the light of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the Act 
as a whole, and the application of the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the 
case may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies involved." U.C.C. § 1-102 comment I 
(1978). 
69. The official comment to U.C.C. § 9-101 provides in part: "The aim of this Article is to 
provide a simple and unified structure within which the immense variety of present-day secured 
financing transactions can go forward with less cost and with greater certainty." U.C.C. § 9-101 
Official Comment (1978). 
70. See Sortor, supra note 63, at 719, citing U.C.c. § 9-208 (1978) (allowing debtor to 
obtain information from secured party regarding the amount of the debt and collateral) and 
U.C.C. § 9-402 (1978) (requiring financing statement to contain specified information). 
71. See supra note 40 for a brief discussion of the first-to-file rule. 
72. See Sortor, supra note 63, at 719. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-311 (1978) (authorizing debtors to 
transfer their rights in collateral notwithstanding provision in security agreement prohibiting such 
transfer). 
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fered by various courts, together with those proposed by legal commen-
tators, will be analyzed with a view to their tendency to further or in-
hibit these goals. 
III. POSSIBLE. SOLUTIONS 
Courts have responded to junior foreclosures in an uncertain and 
unsatisfactory fashion. Judges tend to deal with the problem in one of 
three ways: (1) by prohibiting junior party foreclosures; (2) by distrib-
uting junior sale proceeds to senior parties; or (3) by leaving senior 
parties to their remedy against the collateral. 
A. Prohibiting Junior Party Foreclosures 
One. way to deal with the problem of junior party foreclosures is 
simply to prohibit them. This approach may take one of two forms: (1) 
the sale itself may be proscribed, via pre-sale judicial· disapproval or 
post-sale sanction against a selling junior party; o,r (2) the sale itself 
may be authorized, but a junior party's position as seller may effec-
tively be preempted by a senior party who begins foreclosure of its own 
interest. 
1. Prohibition of Sale (The No-Sale Option) 
A few courts 'have taken the rather drastic position that a junior 
party lacks authority to sell the collateral upon a debtor's default. In 
Roemer & Zeller v. Ace Transmission Center7S ("Roemer-I"), a junior 
secured party sought judicial authority to replevy collateral that was in 
the possession of a defaulting debtor. A senior creditor intervened in 
opposition, arguing that replevin by the junior creditor would prejudice 
its rights and interests. Finding no statutory authorization for sales by 
junior parties, the court denied the junior party's request. In explana-
tion, the court observed that the order of distribution in section 9-504 
"does not even contemplate the situation where a party with a 
73. 114 Misc. 2d 310, 451 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. 1982) [hereinafter Roemer-I), vacated, 
114 Misc. 2d 415, 454 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1982) [hereinafter Roemer-2]. See infra notes 
101-04 and accompanying text for a discussion of the latter opinion. 
In Roemer-I, the plaintiff, a wholesale seller of auto parts, had sold the debtor merchandise 
for its inventory and taken a security interest in that merchandise to secure payment of the 
purchase price. When the debtor defaulted in its payments, the plaintiff sought to replevy the 
merchandise. Chase Manhattan Bank, which held a prior security interest in all of the debtor's 
inventory, intervened in opposition to the plaintiffs motion. The plaintiffs security interest was 
subordinate to the Bank's interest because the plaintiff failed to perfect under § 9-312(3). [d. 
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subordinate security interest can dispose of the collateral over the ob-
jections of a creditor with a prior security interest."H 
The reasoning of the court in Roemer-/ is troublesome. In its 
haste to consult the proceeds distribution scheme of section 9-504( 1), 
the court overlooked the basic tenet of that section authorizing a se-
cured party to sell collateJal upon a debtor's default.75 Section 9-504(1) 
does not condition a secured party's right to sell on a showing of supe-
rior priority. Neither is a secured party's right to repossess the collat-
eral under section 9-50376 conditioned on its superior priority~77 Unfor-
tunately, the court failed' to explain the impact of these crucial 
provisions. Soon after Roemer-/ was decided, it was, in effect, aban-
doned by the same court, which came down with a different though 
equally troublesome theory in Roemer-2.7S 
As a solution to the problem, the prohibition of .junior party fore-
closures suffers from an initial practical limitation-it requires that 
some form of affirmative action be taken to stop the sale. Unless the 
junior party seeks judicial authority to act, as in Roemer-/, the sale 
could be avoided only by intervention of the senior party. Yet the sen-
ior . party may be unaware of the proposed sale.79 This roadblock, of 
course, could be circumvented simply by ensuring that a junior party 
notify a senior party prior to sale.so Alternatively, a junior secured 
party could be penalized' after the fact of sale. For example, a few 
courts have taken the d~bious view that a foreclosing junior party is 
guilty of converting the collateral. 
Such was the approach taken by the court in Chadron Energy 
Corp. v. First. Nat'l Bank.s1 In Chadron, a bank holding company 
formed by borrowers to acquire bank stock sued the secured lender who 
had sold the stock. After finding that the lender held only a junior in-
terest due to a novation, the court reached the startling conclusion that 
74. Roemer-I, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 603. 
75. The first sentence of § 9-504(1) states: "A secured party after default may sell, lease or 
otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its then condition or following any commercially 
reasonable preparation or processing." U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (1978). 
76. for the text of U.C.C. § 9-503 see supra note 16. 
77. This is not necessarily to say that § 9-503 authorizes a junior party to retain possession 
if a senior party seeks to repossess and sell the collateral itself. See infra notes 87-97 and accom-
panying text. 
78. See infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text. 
79. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. 
80. See infra notes 141-64 and accompanying text. 
81. 221 Neb. 590, 379 N.W.2d 742 (1986). See also Rushmore State Bank v. Kurylas, Inc., 
42 N.W.2d 649 (S.D. 1988). 
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the lender's sale of the stock constituted a conversion.s2 As in Roemer-
1, the court failed to explain the impact of sections 9-503 and 9-504(1), 
which generally give a secured party authority to repossess and sell the 
collateral upon a debtor's default. 
Courts would be required to undertake a major reconstruction of 
the law before they could legitimately hold that a party who has a valid 
security interest cannot enforce it and would be guilty of conversion if 
it did so. Even if the junior creditor somehow acted improperly in dis-
posing of the collateral, its liability for conversion should depend on 
some demonstrated harm to the senior secured party.S3 Arguably, the 
act of sale does not in itself establish such harm, as the senior party's 
interest continues in the collateral after sale, thus giving the senior 
party a right to repossess the collateral from the purchaser.s• 
The prohibition of junior party foreclosures, by either pre-sale dis-
approval or post-sale sanction, clearly contravenes sections 9~503 and 
9-504. In addition, this approach taises serious policy concerns. Giving 
the senior party a unilateral right to prevent transfer of the collateral 
would disrupt the general Code scheme of free alienability of property 
and would contravene the directive of section 9-311 that the debtor's 
rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred. sCi 
Conferring a virtual veto power on the senior party would do much to 
protect its interests, but would· completely ignore the interests of the 
junior pa·rty. This myopic approach would disadvantage a junior party 
so . severely that the future of secondary financing might be 
jeopardized.s6 . 
82. The court thought this conclusion was "clear, beyond reason." In support, the court 
reasoned: "Where property is subject to a security interest, an exercise of dominion or control over 
the property which is inconsistent with the rights of the secured party, constitutes, as to him, a 
conversion of the property; and there may be conversion by [a] secured party where his acts are in 
defiance of the rights of others in the property." 379 N.W.2d at 750 (quoting Trust Co. v. Associ-
ated Grocers Co-op, 152 Ga. App. 701, 702, 263 S.E.2d 676, 677 (1979». 
83. See R HILLMAN. J. McDONNELL & S. NICKELS, supra note 64, " 25.02[5][a]. 
84. For a discussion of the senior party's post-sale rights in the collaretal see infra notes 
124-40 and accompanying text. 
85. This section provides: "The debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involunta-
rily transferred (by way of sale, creation of a security interest, attachment, levy, garnishment or 
other judicial process) notwithstanding a provision in the security agreement prohibiting any 
transfer or making the transfer constitute a default." U.C.C. § 9-311 (1978). 
86. Speaking to the somewhat less drastic option of requiring a junior party to turn over 
sale proceeds to a senior party, Homer Kripke observed, "If SP2 had to turn his sale proceeds over 
to SPI he would have so little control of his investment that as a practical matter there would 
never be an SP2 who took junior security on a commercial basis instead of just grabbing what he 
could in a salvage situation. Who among us has the wisdom to decide that it is in the public 
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2. Preemption of Junior Party (The Senior Sale Option) 
At least one court has applied a variation of the prohibition ap-
proach which honors the Code policy of free alienability of property 
while recognizing the interests of both secured parties. In American 
Heritage & Trust Co. v. 0&£, Inc.,87 a Colorado court approved a 
senior party's repossession of. collateral from a junior party who had 
taken it from a defaulting debtor. The court further directed the senior 
party to sell the collateral and to give the junior party any proceeds 
remaining after payment of the costs of sale and satisfaction of the 
senior interest.88 This approach, in effect, allows the senior party to 
preempt the junior party. 
A preemption alternative raises one foundational concern. Unless 
the debtor is in default on the senior loan as in American Heritage, the 
Code does not seem to authorize foreclosure by the senior party. Sec-
tions 9-503 and 9-504(1) both premise a secured party's right to repos-
sess and sell the collateral on the debtor's default. To interpret these 
sections to authorize a secured party to foreclose its interest when the 
debtor has defaulted on an unrelated obligation would twist the plain 
meaning of the text. 
The necessity of establishing a default as to the senior interest 
may actually be little more than a theoretical concern. The likelihood 
that a debtor will default on one debt but continue to make payments 
on another seems remote. In addition, security agreements very often 
provide that the creation or foreclosure of a junior interest constitutes 
an event of default as to the senior interest.8s 
interest to discourage secondary financing for the vast investment in new types of assets in our 
great new world-fleets of airplanes, ships, specialized railroad cars, and automobiles; nuclear 
fuel; computer hardware and software; cat scan machines and other medical and biological wiz-
ardry; instruments for sending long and short radio, TV, and energy waves, etc.?" Letter from 
Homer Kripke to William Hawkland (Apr. 3, 1989) (on file at Detroit College of Law Library). 
See also infra notes 98-123 and accompanying text. 
87. 40 Colo. App. 306, 576 P.2d 566 (1978). 
88. In American Heritage, the junior and senior parties both held security interests in a 
debtor's inventory, stock in trade, furniture, fixtures and equipment of a wine shop. When the 
debtors defaulted on both loans, the junior secured party took over the debtor's assets and began 
operating the business. Sometime thereafter, the senior secured party replevied the collateral pur-
suant to writ 576 P.2d at 567. It is troublesome to note the absence of any indication in the 
opinion that the senior party sought to sell the collateral. 
89. In the extraordinary case in which a debtor has not defaulted on the senior interest, a 
court could authorize a senior party to step in and conduct the junior sale on behalf of the junior 
party. This stand-in option seems unsatisfactory since a senior party who would not share in sale 
proceeds would have little incentive to minimize sale costs and maximize purchase price. Code 
goals of economic efficiency would thus be compromised. The better approach would be to limit 
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An additional concern is the absence of any explicit Code provi-
sion empowering a senior party effectively to halt a junior party fore-
closure.90 The ability of the court in American Heritage to supplant the 
junior party stemmed from that party's violation of the default rules of 
Part 5 of Article 9.91 The junior party's violation triggered section 9-
507(1), which provides that if a "secured party is not proceeding in 
accordance with the provisions of this Part, disposition may be ordered 
or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions."92 Apparently, it 
was this violation that enabled the court to take the "appropriate" ac-
tion, under section 9-507(1) of authorizing the senior party to sell the 
collateral. Absent a junior party's violation of the default rules, a senior 
party's right to preempt a junior party depends on implicit rather than 
explicit Code authorization. 
The priority rules of section 9-312 do not explicitly establish a sen-
ior party's right to repossess collateral from a junior party. These rules 
speak only to the question of whether a party has priority, leaving open 
issues of the privileges of priority. 
At least one other Code section has been suggested as support for 
a senior party's right to foreclose its own interest after a junior party 
has repossessed the collateral.93 Section 9-201 states: "Except as other-
wise provided by this Act, a security agreement is effective according to 
its terms .... "94 The comment to section 9-201 recognizes an excep-
tion to this broad rule in cases where Article 9 subordinates a party's 
security interest to that of another secured party. Arguably, "the terms 
of a junior secured party's security agreement, including his right to 
possession of the collateral on the debtor's default, are ineffective 
against another secured party whose inter~st is given priority under Ar-
ticle 9."911 Thus, if the debtor has defaulted on the senior interest, a 
senior party could foreclose its interest by repossessing the collateral 
the preemption option to cases in which a debtor has defaulted on the senior interest. 
90. The absence of clear Code direction is noted in J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, 
§ 25-9, where the authors observe: "It would appear (though the text is not wholly clear) that any 
such secured party senior to the foreclosing sec\lred party is at least entitled to take over and 
control the conduct of the foreclosure proceedings." 
91. In American Heritage, the junior secured party failed to notify the senior party of its 
plan to operate a wine shop. 576 P.2d at 568. The failure violated the 1962 version of § 9-505(2) 
which required a secured party to provide written notice to other secured parties of its intent to 
retain the colla tera!' 
92. U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (1978). 
93. See R. HILLMAN, J. McDONNELL & S. NICKELS, supra note 64, II 25.02[2][c). 
94. V.C.c. § 9-201 (1978). 
95. R. HILLMAN, J. McDONNELL & S. NICKELS, supra note 64, II 25.02[2][c). at 25-56. 
HeinOnline -- 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 583 1990-1991
1991]- SALES :BY. JUNIOR SECURED PARTIES 583 
from the junior party and conducting its own sale. A junior party who 
refuses to surrender the collateral would be liable for conversion if its 
conduct seriously injured the senior party.96 
Although explicit Code authorization for senior preemption is 
lacking, policy considerations support this alternative. Armchair equity 
suggests that if priority means anything, it means a paramount right to 
take the collateral from a defaulting debtor. If a senior party believes it 
would be in its best interest to foreclose, that party should not be pre-
vented from doing so simply because a junior party rather than the 
debtor has the coJlateral. 
In a well-ordered world, senior preemption should not compromise 
the junior party's ability to recover its interest. As long as bidders at a 
default sale are aware of both junior and senior interests, one would 
expect a junior sale to yield a smaller sale price than a senior sale, 
because the junior sale does not discharge the senior interest. Similarly, 
a senior sale should yield a higher purchase price because that sale 
discharges all subordinate security interests. Consequently, in practice, 
a junior party may have a similar chance of recovering its investment 
whether or not it conducts the sale. 
The only real unfairness in allowing a senior party to preempt a 
junior party stems from the possibility that a senior party will delay in 
enforcing its rights. If at any time up until the instant of sale a word 
from the senior party could transform· the junior sale into a senior sale, 
the junior party would be placed ina' tenuous position. An eleventh 
hour ambush by the senior party could oust the junior party even after 
it had gone to the trouble of making all the sale arrangements. Thus, if 
a senior party is allowed to preempt the junior party, it should be re-
quired to do so within a reasonable time after receiving notice of a 
junior party's plan to sell the collatera1.97 Timely notice to .the senior 
party clearly would be an essential part of such a rule. 
B. Distributing Proceeds to Senior Parties 
Other courts facing the problem 'ofjunior foreclosures have held 
that although the Code does not preclude the junior party from selling 
the collateral, the junior party must account to the senior party for. sale 
96. See id. II 25.02(5)[al (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 229 (1965)). 
97. See Byrne, Murphy & Vukowich, supra note 6, at 1927 (suggesting that a senior party 
should have 14 days to act, either to cure the debtor's default, to negotiate with the junior party, 
or to conduct the sale itself). 
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proceeds. Indeed, a junior party who fails to do so may be guilty of 
conversion. 
In Consolidated Equip. Salesv. First Bank & Trust,BS for exam-
ple, a junior secured party had repossessed and sold a wheel loader 
after the debtor defaulted on the junior loan. A bank with a senior 
security interest in the same wheel loader subsequently sued the junior 
party for conversion. The court correctly noted that section 9-503 gave 
the junior party a right to repossess the wheel loader since first priority 
status is nota prerequisite to repossession, However, the court further 
reasoned that upon sale of the collateral, the junior party was required 
to relinquish the proceeds to the senior party; the junior party's failure 
to do so constituted a conversion.BB Unfortunately, the court failed to 
address the priority distribution scheme of section 9-504( 1), which 
neither requires nor permits a foreclosing junior party to share proceeds 
with a senior party.lOO 
Similarly, in Roemer & Zeller v. Ace Transmission Center101 
(hereinafter referred to as Roemer-2) , a New York court concluded 
that a senior party had no power under the Code to prevent the junior 
party's sale of the collateral,lo2 The court casually observed, however, 
that "[o]f course the senior secured party's lien would still have priority 
over that of the junior secured party with regard to the proceeds of any 
98. 627 P.2d 432 (Okla. 1981). In this case, McBride purchased a wheel loader from Con-
solidated in November 1973 for $50,619.00. Consolidated took a security interest in the wheel 
loader but did not qualify for purchase money priority because of failure to timely file a financing 
statement. Earlier that year, Bank had taken a security interest in all of McBride's equipment 
'~now owned [or] hereinafter acquired." [d. at 434. Shortly after McBride declared bankruptcy in 
1975, Consolidated took the wheel loader, leased it for six months, and timely sold it for 
$28,400.00. Meanwhile, Bank sued McBride on defaulted notes and won an $84,000.00 judgment 
against him. Shortly thereafter, McBride personally guaranteed payment to Bank and assigned to 
Bank his interest in the wheel loader. [d. 
99. [d. at 438. The court did not detail the junior party's sale. The opinion does not indicate 
whether the purchaser at foreclosure knew the collateral was subject to a senior security interest 
which would continue after sale. It is not clear \vhether sale proceeds were appropriate in amount 
for a sale subject to a senior interest. 
100. As authority for its finding of conversion, the court cited, without discussion, the prior-
ity rule of § 9-312(5)(a), and the proceeds rule of § 9-306(2). [d. See infra notes 108-15 and 
accompanying text. As authority for its award of conversion damages against Consolidated, the 
court cited "failure to comply with th~ default procedures of § 9-501 el seq:, which brings into 
play § 9-507( I )." 627 P.2d at 438. 
101. 114 Misc. 2d 415, 454 N.Y.S.2d 377(1982). For a brief review of the facts of this 
case, see supra note 73. 
\02. The court explained that it found "no indication that any particular creditor may uni-
laterally prevent seizure of a debtor's assets solely as an incident of the status of the preferred 
party." 454 N.Y.S.2d at 378. 
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repossessed collateral."103 The court gave no explanation and cited no 
authority for this assertion. Other courts have reached the same ulti-
mate conclusion on equally dubious grounds.104 
The shared prp~eeds approach has some intuitive appeal. Requir-
ing a junior party to account to a senior party would honor the Code 
rules on free alienability of property, the junior party's right to dispose 
of the collateral, and the senior party's first priority. Closer examina-
tion, however, reveals serious shortcomings in this option. 
Initially, it lacks Code authority. Giving a senior party first prior-
ity in default sale proceeds conflicts with the speCific order of distribu-
tion detailed in section 9-504(1). That section does, not include a senior 
secured party among those entitled to share in default sale proceeds. 1011 
The clear direction of section 9-504(1), however, does not pose an ob-
stacle to courts determined to require an accounting. For example, in 
Stotts v. Johnson,106 an Arkansas court recently confronted a case in-
volving a junior party's repossession and sale of a trailer. The court 
candidly conceded that Article 9 does not give a senior party a right t6 
sale proceeds, but reasoned that "the plain meaning and logical impli-
cations of sections such as 9-306 and 9-504 may be preempted by a 
pervasive spirit of priority that supports giving a s'enior secured i:>arty a 
claim to the proceeds .... "107 While the court's identification of rele-
vant Code sections is an improvement over decisions by other courts, its 
103. [d. 
104. See, e.g., Bank of Danville v. Farmers Nat'l Bank, 602 S.W.2d 160 (Ky. 1980) (be-
cause security interest was inferior to that of Danville, Farmers not entitled to participate in 
proceeds of tobacco crop until Danville has been fully satisfied); American Fin. Corp., v. Computer 
Sciences Corp., 558 F. Supp, 182 (D. Del. 1983), Uunior secured party can levy over objection of 
senior secured party, but proceeds of sale must be distributed according to priority rules). ' 
Not all courts have required a junior secured party to account to a senior party for sale 
proceeds. See United States v. Coohan, [5 New Developments) secured Transactions Guide 
(CCH) ~ 55,154 (E.D.N.C. February 9, 1990). In Coohan, a bank which ,held a junior security 
interest repossessed and sold a bulldozer from a defaulting farmer. The Farmers Home Adminis-
tration, which held a senior security interest, claimed proceeds of sale. The court denied the 
FHA's claim, explaining that the proceeds rule of §, 9-306(2) applies only where proceeds are 
received by a debtor and observing that the FHA had recourse against the collateral. See also 
Continental Bank v. Krebs, 184 III. App. 3d 693, 540 N.E.2d 1023 (1989), In Krebs, a Junior 
creditor repossessed and sold an automobile upon the debtor's default, Plaintiff, claiming to be, a 
senior secured party, then sought a share of sale proceeds. The c;ourt specifically rejected the 
argument that § 9-503 authorizes only senior secured parties to repossess collateral, and further 
determined that a senior secured party has no right to proceeds from a junior sale, 
105. See supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text. 
106. 302 Ark. 439, 791 S.W.2d 351 (1990). 
107. 791 S.W.2d at 351. 
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willingness to disregard those sections in favor of a "spirit" of priority 
is troubling. 
No other Code section requires or authorizes a junior party to ac-
count to a senior party for sale proceeds. The Code's general priority 
rules do not require such an accounting. Those rules speak only to the 
issue of who has priority and not to the separate issue of the privileges 
of priority. 
At first blush, the proceeds rule of section 9-306(2) seems implic-
itly to require a junior party to account to a senior party. That section 
essentially provides that a security interest "continues in any identifi-
able proceeds, including collections received by a debtor."lo8 The text 
seems to condition continuation of the security interest on the debtor's 
receipt of proceeds.109 The dispositive question, of course, is whether 
"received by the debtor" modifies "proceeds" or only "collections." If a 
senior party's interest continues only in proceeds received by a debtor, 
section 9-306(2) will not aid a senior party hoping to collect proceeds 
received by a junior party,110 
The history of section 9-306 suggests an intent to address only the 
issue of proceeds that are received by a debtor. The 1952 official text of 
section 9-306 specified that '~the security' interest continues on any 
identifiable proceeds received by the debtor .... "lll The words "in-
cluding collections" first appeared in the 1957 text,112 upon the recom-
mendation of the Permanent Editorial Board.1l3 The purpose of the 
1957 revision was not to alter existing law, but merely to "clarify" itY" 
Thus, section 9-306 seems inapplicable to default sales, where a se-
cured party rather than a debtor receives the proceeds. Not all courts, 
however, have adopted this restrictiv~ interpretation of section 9-
306(2).lUI 
I . 
. ~ ,'.' , 
108. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1978)' provides: "Except where this Article otherwise provides. a 
security interest continues in col.1ateral not~ithstanding sale. exchange. or other disposition thereof 
unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise. 
and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor." 
109. for a helpful discussion of this issue. see R. HILLMAN. J. McDONNELL & S. NICKELS. 
supra note 64. 11 25.02(4)[b). 
110. Any surplus proceeds paid to a debtor could be reached under this interpretation of 
§ 9-306(2). 
Ill. U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1952 Official Text), 
112. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1957 Official Text). 
113. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1956 Recommendations of the Permanent Editorial Board of the 
Uniform Commercial Code). 
114. [d. 
115. for a comprehensive discussion of rece,nt cases addressing this issue. see E. REILEY. 
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To eliminate the tension between sections 9-504( 1) and 9~306(2), 
William Hawkland recently drafted two amendments to the official 
Uniform Commercial Code in Louisiana. First, "receipts" was substi-
tuted for "proceeds" in the last line of section 9-504(1).116 Second, sec-
tion 9-306(1) was amended by adding the following sentence: "'Pro-
ceeds' includes whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection, 
or other disposition of collateral or proceeds but does not include re-
ceipts that are derived from the disposition of collateral by a secured 
party by way of public or private sale under R.S. 10:9-504 or by judi-
cial sale pursuant to applicable law."p7 These two simple alterations . 
should make it clear that the proceeds rule of section 9-306 does qot 
entitle a senior party to receipts of a junior party's default sale. 
At least two other Code sections might be, interpreted to support a 
senior party's claim to proceeds of.a junior sale. Either interpretation, 
however, is very tenuous. Section 9-507(1) makes a foreclosing party 
liable to other secured parties for any loss caused by failure to comply 
with the rules of Part 5 of Article 9. 118 This section does not exclude 
senior parties, and thus implies that a senior party, like other secured 
parties, has a stake in the outcome of. the sale, i.e., a claim to sale 
proceeds. This conclusion, however, does not mean that the s·enior party 
has a prior claim to sale proceeds. The senior party's claim to any sur-· 
plus received by the debtor· would be sufficient to give it a stake in the 
outcome of the sale. . 
Similarly, sections 9-312(3) arid (4) could be interpreted to sup-
port a senior party's claim to sale proceeds.1l9 Subsection (3) essen-
tially provides that a purchase 'money security interest in inventory also 
has priority in identifiable cash proceeds under certain circumstances. 
Subsection (4) gives a purchase money security interest in collateral 
other than inventory priority in proceeds if the interest is perfected at 
the time the debtor takes possession of the collateral or within teIlqays 
";. :"" •• 1 
GUIDEBOOK TO SECURITY INTERESTS Ir-j PERSONAL PROPERTY §. 5,-6[3](d] (2d ed, 1989), 
116, LA. REV. STAT. ANN, § 10:9-504(1)(West, 1990). 
117, LA. REV. STAT. ANN, § 10:9-306(1)(West 1990), 
118. This argument is presented and wisely rejected in R. HILLMAN, J. McDONNELL & S. 
NICKELS, supra note 64, 11 25,02[4][a] n,265. U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (1978) provides iii pertinent 
part: "If the disposition has occurred the debtor or any person entitled to . notification or whose 
security interest has been made known to the secl!redparty prior to the disposition has a right to 
recover from the secured party any loss caused ,by a failure to comply with the provisions of this 
Part." .. 
119, This view is explained and rejected with appropriate speed in R. HILLMAN. J. McDON-
NELL & S. NICKELS, supra note 64. 
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thereafter. It is not clear, however, that the "proceeds" mentioned in 
section 9-312 include receipts from a section 9-504 sale.l2O Indeed, in-
terpredng section 9-312 to apply to default sales would produce a clear 
conflict between its provisions and the explicit provisions of section 9-
504. This potential conflict suggests that the scope of section 9-312 
does not extend to default sales. 
In addition to the problem of the lack of Code authority, the 
shared proceeds approach raises serious policy concerns. Most impor-
tantly, it is inimical to secondary financing. If a junior party had to 
turn over sale proceeds to a senior party, the junior would have little 
control of its investment. Since parties are often undercollateralized, 
payment of proceeds to the senior party would likely deplete available 
funds. Yet, after sale the junior party would have no claim to the col-
lateral because a default sale .discharges all subordinate security inter-
ests.121 The junior party's inability to control its investment might well 
spell the demise of secondary financing. This consequence would have 
far-reaching implications.122 
Finally, as a practical matter, requiring a junior party to account 
for sale proceeds may not satisfy the senior party who might have pre-
ferred to foreclose on the collateral itself and control the conditions of 
sale in an effort to maximize sale price.123 The unfairness to the senior 
party is exacerbated if that party is uninformed of the sale. 
C. Leaving Senior Parties to Their Remedies Against the Collateral 
Another way to deal with the issue of junior foreclosures is simply 
to leave the parties alone. Arguably, intervention is unnecessary be-
cause the 1972 Code adequately protects even an uninformed senior 
party. To the extent the debtor was personally liable on the sen'ior in-
terest prior to sale, the debtor is still liable. More importantly, the sen-
ior interest in the collateral continues after sale.1u This continuing in-
120. See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text for ,a discussion of whether "proceeds" 
as used in § 9-306 includes receipts of a foreclosure sale. 
121. U.e.e. § 9-504(4) (1978). 
122. See supra note 86. 
123. See Wechsler. Rights and Remedies of the Secured Party After an Unauthorized 
Transfer of Collateral: A Proposal for Balancing Competing Claims ill Repossession. Resale. 
Proceeds, alld Conversion .Cases, 32 BUFFALO L. REV. 373, 390 (1983) ("Controlling the time. 
place and manner of the sale is a valuable attribute of the secured party's senior position. "). The 
ability of the senior party to sell the collateral probably would depend on the debtor being in 
default as to the senior party. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text. 
124. See U.e.C. § 9-306(2) (1978). 
HeinOnline -- 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 589 1990-1991
1991] SALES BY JUNIOR SECURED PARTIES 589 
terest gives a senior party authority to repossess the collateral from the 
purchaser at the foreclosure sale, or if the purchaser is unwilling or 
unable to remit the collateral, to sue the purchaser for conversion.1211 
As a practical matter, the purchaser may agree to pay -the senior debt 
in exchange for the senior. party's agreement to forebear from repos-
sessing the collateral. The notion that the transfer of rights in collateral 
does not injure secured parties implicitly underscores the Code policy 
favoring free alienability of property rights. 126 This view has been en-
dorsed by some courts127 and commentators.128 
In some cases, however, the prospect of a junior foreclosure may 
distress a senior party. Generally, secured parties view repossession and 
sale as a "last resort, a desperate remedy to be avoided whenever possi-
ble."129 A junior party foreclosure forces this last resort. The junior 
foreclosure may especially distress the senior party who is satisfied with 
the status quo. That senior party may have been receiving payments 
from a debtor either who had not defaulted on th.e senior loan, or with 
whom the senior party had chosen to negotiate a workout. Tqe junior 
party's foreclosure may force the senior party to take an early pay-out 
on what it considers to be a satisfactory investment. 
Moreover, repossession of the collateral may diminish the debtor's 
incentive to continue to pay the senior party/so or may jeopardize the 
debtor's ability to repay the senior loan. For a debtor in financial 
straits, repossession of inventory or equipment may be the final straw 
that causes collapse of the debtor's business. In a worst-case scenario, 
loss of the collateral may force a commercial debtor into bankruptcy, 
125. U.C.C. § 9·306, comment 3 (1978). In such cases, the senior party may also have an 
action for conversion against the junior creditor who "in essence, guarantees that the senior· see 
cured party's priority over him will be vindicated." R. HILLMAN. J. McDONNELL & S. NICKELS, 
supra note 64,11 25.02[4)[d], at 25·78. 
126. See U.C.C. § 9·311 (1978), providing that the debtor's rights in collateral may be 
voluntarily or involuntarily transferred. See also supra note 72. 
127. See, e.g., United States v. Coohan, [5 New Developments) Secured Transactions 
Guide (CCH) 11 55,154 (E.D. N.C. February 9, 1990). See also Continental Bank v. Krebs, 184 
III. App.3d 693, 540 N.E.2d 1023 (1989). 
128. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 25·9. if the junior secured party 
conducts the sale, the interest of the senior secured party is protected since its security interest 
continues to attach to the collateral in possession of the purchaser). 
129. G. GILMORE, supra note 10, § 44.1, at 1214. 
130. If the debtor has other personal assets, and especially if the senior party has interests 
in any other assets of the debtor, it is of course more likely that the debtor will continue to pay the 
senior party. 
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thus triggering an automatic stay, which would temporarily freeze en-
forcement of the senior security interest. 131 
In addition to losing some of its leverage against the original 
debtor, the senior party may find itself undercollateralized if the collat-
eral has reduced in value in the hands of the purchaser. The collateral, 
for example, may have limi~ed value except when being used by the 
debtor in an ongoing business. The junior party's sale may also gener-
ate transaction costs for the senior party; including delay, inconve-
nience and expense in locating and retaking the' collateral from a 
purchaser .132 
. An analogy to real property is sometimes suggested in answer to 
these complaints.133 Real property law permits a junior mortgagee to 
sell its interests without affecting the interests of a senior mortgagee. 13• 
Differences in real property and personal property, however, make this 
analogy' unpersuasive. Unlike real property, personal property can be 
easily moved. This mobility, together with the speedy foreclosure pro-
cess of the Code (as compared with the cumbersome procedures for 
sale of rear property), may mean· that by the time the senior party 
learns of the sale, the purchaser has moved the property to a new loca-
tiol). or even a new jurisdiction. The senior party's costs will be even 
greater if there are several purchasers of multiple items. Moreover, in a 
worst case scenario, the senior party may encounter difficulty in locat-
ing the collateral, especially in states that do not require recording of a 
purchaser's identity.13II Given these important differences, rules ade-
quate to protect a first mortgagee of real estate are likely to be inade-
quate in cases of personal property. 
Most of the hardship inflicted .upon a senior party by a junior fore-
131. See Bankruptcy Code § 362 (B~nder, 1990). For a discussion of the automatic stay as 
it applies to security interests, see B. CLARK, supra note II, 11 6.08. 
132. See Justice, Secured Parties and Judgment Creditors-The Courts and Section 9-3// 
0/ the Uniform Commercial Code, 30Bu~. LAW .. 433, 434 (1975). 
133. For a persuasive criticism of the analogy of·real property law to § 9·311, see Byrne, 
Murphy & Vukowich, supra note 6, at 1908.-14. 
See also Roemer-/ where the court rejected the junior party's argument that repossession 
and sale of personal property resembles a mortgage foreclosure proceeding in which a second 
mortgage may be foreclosed without regard to whether the first mortgage is in default. The court 
. reasoned' that the action of the second mortgage holder is specifically authorized by statute, unlike 
similar actions against personal property. 451 N .Y.S.2d 603 (1982) (citing N.Y. [Real Prop. 
Acts) § 1315 (West Consol. 1979». 
134. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN. REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.1~ (2d ed. 1985). 
135. See Wechsler, supra note 123 .. at 396, citing N.Y. CIY. PRAC. LAW § 5233(a) which 
does not require record keeping in sales by public auction. 
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closure could be avoided if a senior party were given notice of a junior 
party's plan to foreclose. A senior party aware of an impending sale has 
several options: it can avoid sale by curing the debtor's default or by 
orchestrating a business workout;IS6 it can foreclose its own interest if 
the debtor has defaulted on the senior debt;IS7 or it can purchase the 
collateral itself at the junior sale. ls6 An informed senior party might 
decline to exercise these options for any number of reasons, including 
the possibility that it views a junior foreclosure not as the worst-case 
scenario described above, but as closer to a best-case scenario. The sen-
ior party may, for example, welcome substitution of a more financially 
sound purchaser for the original debtor who has defaulted on the junior 
interest. Such a senior party will be· satisfied with its post-sale interest 
in the collateral. . 
There is one case, however, in which a continuing interest in the 
collateral cannot protect the senior party. If the junior party forecloses 
by collecting accounts, chattel paper, or instruments, the collateral is 
reduced to zero-value and the. senior party thus has lost its security.ls9 
In such situations, the senior party should be given a superior right to 
sale proceeds. Without this right, it would be left without a remedy. 
The inequity of this result prompted Wliliam Hawkland to redraft the 
Louisiana version of section 9-502 to provide that, notwithstanding sec-
tion 9-504, where a secured party forecloses by collecting accounts or 
instruments, receipts are to be applied to security interests in their or-
der of priority. 140 
V. PROPOSAL 
If there is any unfairness in junior foreclosures, it exists because 
the Code authorizes a worst-case scenario-a case in which an unin-
formed senior party discovers postmortem that a junior party has sold 
136. For a discussion of the business workout, see B. CLARK, supra note II, 11 4.03. 
137. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text. 
138. U .C.C. § 9-504(3) (1978) recogriizes a secured party's right to purchase the collateral. 
That section provides in pertinent part: "The secured party may buy at any' public sale and if the 
collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a type which is the subject 
of widely distributed standard price quotations he may buy at private sale." This right was long 
recognized at common law. See G. GILMORE, supra note 10, §. 44.6, at 1241. 
139. This point was made by William Hawkland in a letter. to Homer Kripke. See Letter 
from William Hawkland, supra note 61':' 
140. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-502 (West 1989). That section states: "notwithstanding 
the provisions of R.S. 10:9-504, where the secured party collects from an account debtor or obli-
gor on an instrument the receipt of such .collection shall be applied to security interests in the 
order of their priority." 
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its collateral and retained sale proceeds. This scenario rings two equita-
ble alarms: (1) the senior party's collateral was sold without its knowl-
edge; and (2) the junior party's interest was satisfied first, notwith-
standing the senior party's priority. 
A. The Notice Problem 
The problem of uninformed senior parties could easily be resolved 
by reinstating amodified version of the 1962 rule requiring a foreclos-
ing party to notify all secured parties of record prior to sale.1O This 
. rule would ensure that a senior party, including those with ordinary 
security interests or purchase money security interests in equipment, 
would receive notice of a section 9-504 sale. An informed senior party 
could then take whatever action it deemed appropriate to protect its 
in teres ts. 142 
The simple 1962 requirement that a foreclosing party notify "all 
other secured parties who have duly filed a financing statement ... in 
this state" should be clarified. It is unclear whether this language re-
quires a foreclosing party to search the records of every state, since 
"this" state is not defined. One could reasonably suppose that "this" 
state means the state in which some aspect of the default process is 
being litigated. If this is the case, then as a practical matter, foreclos-
ing parties would need to search the files in every state in which an 
action could be brought against them. 
At least one other reading is possible. Commenting upon the al-
most identical notice requirement in the 1962 version of section 9-
505(2),143 Professor Gilmore observed: "Which state is meant by 'this' 
state in this context may be somewhat ambiguous. Presumably it 
means the state in which the secured party who makes the proposal [to 
retain the collateral] is required to file or otherwise perfect his security 
interest. "IH 
141. The additional provision in the 1962 rule requiring a foreclosing party to notify any 
person "who is known by the secured party to have a security interest in the collateral" should not 
. be reinstated because of its tendency to provoke litigation over the foreclosing party's actual 
knowledge. See supra note 32. 
142. See supra notes 136·38 and accompanying text. 
143. U.c.c. § 9·505(2) (I962) provided in pertinent part: 
." Written notice shall be sent ... to any other secured party who has a security interest in 
the collateral and who has duly filed a financing statement indexed in the name of the 
debtor in this state or is known by the secured party in possession to have a security inter· 
est in it. 
144. G. GILMORE, supra note 10, at 1223 n.3. 
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Whether or not Professor Gilmore's presumption is the most plau-
sible interpretation, his statement suggests a reasonable rule. A fore-
closing party could be required to search the records .in the state in 
which that party would be required to file if it were filing on the date of 
repossession. 1411 :This search should usually disclose all valid security in-
terests of record, except in limited instances where the collateral or the 
debtor was recently moved. 148 The strength of this approach is its reli-
ance on the perfection rules of sections 9-401 and 9-103. If those rules 
would require a foreclosing party to file in a particular location, they 
also would ultimately require other secured parties with conflicting in-
terests in the same collateral to file in the same location. Thus, a fore~ 
closing party could usually discover all other valid security interests of 
record simply by searching the records of the state in which it would be 
required to file on the date of repossession. 147 
145. The Code, of course, does not require a party to perfect its interest. If a party chooses 
to perfect, in some cases the Code allows perfection without filing. See U.e.e. § 9-302(1) (1978). 
If a party elects to perfect by filing, it must comply with the Article 9 rules governing that pro-
cess, including rules specifying the proper place to file. Section 9-401 governs the location of a 
filing within a given state. That section offers states three alternatives, the most widely adopted of 
which requires central filing in most cases and local filing where the collateral is fixtures, con-
sumer goods, or farm-related collateral. U.C.C. §. 9-401 (1978). See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, 
supra note 9, § 22-14. 
Section 9-103 governs perfection in multiple state transactions. If the collateral is documents, 
instruments, or ordinary (non-mobile) goods, § 9-103(1) generally requires that a financing state-
ment be filed in the state where the goods are located. Subsection (1 )(c) details a 30-day rule 
applicable to purchase money security interests created in one state but covering collateral to be 
kept in another state. When collateral is moved to. another state, subsection (I )(d) generally re-
quires a secured party either to take possession of the collateral or to refile in the new state within 
four months. U.C.e. § 9-103 (1978). See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 22-21. 
If the collateral is accounts,'general intangibles or certain mobile goods, § 9-103(3)(b) gener-
ally requires filing in the debtor's "location." See U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(a) (1978) (describing ac-
counts, general intangibles, and certain mobile goods); U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(d) (1978) (defining 
location). When a debtor changes location from one state to another, subsection (3)(e) requires a 
secured party to reperfect within four months. U.e.e. § 9-103(3)(e) (1978). See 1. WHITE & R. 
SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 22-23. 
If a secured party fails to reperfect within the four-month grace period of either U.C.e. § 9-
103(1)(d) or (3)(e), the security interest becomes unperfected and "is deemed to have been un-
perfected as against a person who became a purchaser" thereafter. U.e.C. § 9-103(3)(e) (1978). 
A purchaser apparently includes a secured party. See U.C.e. § 1-201(32) (1978) (defining 
purchase). 
If the collateral is chattel paper and perfection is by filing, the rules of § 9-103(3) on general 
intangibles govern. U.C.C. § 9-103(4) (1978). If the collateral is minerals in which the debtor has 
an interest before extraction and which attaches as extracted, filing must be in the jurisdiction in 
which the wellhead or minehead is located. U.C.e. § 9-103(5) (1978). See J. WHITE & R. SUM-
MERS, supra note 9, §§ 22-24, 22-25 .. 
146. See infra notes 147-62 and accompanying text. 
147. This search, of course, will not disclose security interests perfected by means other 
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Under this rule, a party who, for example, repossesses ordinary 
(non-mobile) goods located in Michigan, need not search the. files of 
states other than Michigan. Because a financing statement covering 
non-mobile goods must initially be filed in the state in which the collat-
eral is located (Michigan), a search of Michigan files, in the ordinary 
case, should disclose all valid security interests of record.Hs 
This approach contains one important caveat. A search limited to 
the state in which a financing statement would initially be filed on the 
date of repossession may not disclose security interests enjoying the 
four-month grace period granted by sections 9-103(1)(d) and (3)(e).149 
Consider, for example, the following scenario: Bank has filed a financ-
ing statement in state X to perfect its security interest in ordinary 
goods located in that state. Sometime thereafter, the debtor moves the 
goods to state Y. One month later, Finance Co. takes a security inter-
est in the goods and files a financing statement in state Y. Shortly 
thereafter, the debtor defaults on the interest of Finance Co., which 
quickly forec1.oses. If less than four months has elapsed since relocation 
of the collateral to state Y, Bank's interest may properly be recorded 
only in state X. A search limited to the files of state Y will not disclose 
the interest of Bank, which consequently may not receive notice of Fi-
nance Co. 's sale.1!!0 
Both practical and policy considerations support holding Finance 
Co. accountable for failure to discover and notify Bank in such circum-
stances. As a practical matter, Finance Co. should easily be able to 
discover Bank. At least in the ordinary case in which the junior party's 
subordinate position stems from its second filing, the junior party 
should already be aware of any parties enjoying the four-month grace 
period. A careful junior party. will have asked the debtor as part of the 
pre-loan screening process whether, at the time the junior party took its 
interest, the debtor's collateral (or the debtor's location)l!!l had recently 
than filing. Requiring notice only to parties on file, however, is consistent with the 1962 notice rule 
of § 9·504(3), and seems a reasonable limitation on the search requirement of a foreclosing party. 
See U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1962). 
148. See supra note 145. 
149 .. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9,§§ 22-21, 22-23. 
ISO. A similar scenario could occur if the collateral is accounts, general intangibles, or cer-
tain mobile goods. In these cases, the "location" of ' the debtor determines the place of filing. See 
U.e.C. § 9-103(3)(b) (1978) and supra note 145. If the debtor had relocated within four months 
of the date of repossession, a search of the state in which the debtor is located might not disclose 
parties enjoying the four-month grace period. See U.e.e. § 9-I03(3)(e) (1978). 
lSI. See supra note 145. 
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been moved. Such an inquiry, on a -loan application, for example, is 
necessary to an informed decision on whether to extend credit, because 
it may disclose recently created, conflicting security interes~s on file in 
another state. It therefore seems reasonable to require a second-in-time 
junior party to notify any other secured parties enjoying the four-
month grace period. 11l2 
Cases in which a junior party's subordinate position stems from a 
recently created purchase money security interest pose somewhat more 
troublesome notice issues. IllS In these cases, the junior party cannot 
identify senior interests through an inquiry on the debtor's loan appli-
cation because the senior interest may not have been created at the 
time the junior party took its interest. If the collateral is inventory, 
however, the junior party should be aware of a recently created 
purchase money security interest because section 9-312(3)(b) condi-
tions purchase money priority in inventory on notice to the holder of a 
recorded, conflicting security interest,l1l4 Thus, a junior party who fore-
clQses against inventory should have previously received written notice 
of a recently-created, conflicting purchase money security interest. It 
would seem reasonable to require such a junior party to notify these 
senior parties.IIII! 
152. A first-in-time senior party who forecloses should easily. be able to discover a junior 
party enjoying the four-month grace period. For example, the collateral may have been in state X 
at the time the senior and junior parties took their interests, and later moved to state Y, where it 
was located at the time of the senior party's repossession. I f the four-month reperfection period 
has not yet passed, a search of the files of state Y may not disclose the junior interest. Neverthe-
less, the senior party should be on the alert to check the files of state X since the senior interest is 
recorded in that state. 
153. U.C.C. § 9-103(1 )(c) (1978) may' reduce the risk of undisclosed purchase money in-
terests. That section removes the four-month grace period if the purchase money lender knows (at 
the time its interest attaches) that the goods will be kept in another state. Id. In such cases, the 
purchase money lender must file initially in the state in which the goods will be kept. Id. 
154. U.C.c. § 9-312(3)(b) (1978) provides: 
A perfected purchase money security interest in inventory has priority over a conflicting 
security interest in the same inventory and also has priority in identifiable cash proceeds 
received on or before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer if . . . 
(b) the purchase money secured party gives notification in writing to the holder of the 
conflicting security interest if the holder had filed a financing statement covering the 
same types of inventory . 
(i) before the date of the filing made by the purchase money secured party, or 
(ii) before the beginning of the 21 day period where the purchase money security 
interest is temporarily perfected without filing or possession (subsection (5) of 
Section 9-304)[.J 
155. If the senior party were foreclosing its purchase money security interest against re-
cently-moved inventory, it would seem equally reasonable to require notice to junior parties who 
have not yet reperfected in the new state. A senior party should be aware of the junior party 
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If the collateral is equipment, the problem of the four-month grace 
period is not so easily addressed, because purchase money priority in 
equipment does not depend on notice to holders of conflicting security 
interests. IllS For example, suppose Finance Co. takes a security interest 
in the debtor's equipment, including after-acquired equipment, which it 
properly records in .state X. Bank then finances a new piece of equip-
ment for the debtor and takes a purchase money security interest in 
that equipment, which it properly records in state X. Sometime there-
after, the debtor moves its business, with all its equipment, to state Y. 
Bank has not yet filed in state Y, as it is enjoying the four-month grace 
period. lII7 If Finance Co. forecloses against the equipment, located in 
state Y, a search of the files of state Y would not disclose the interest 
of Bank. IIlS Even in this scenario, it seems reasonable to require Fi-
nance Co. to discover and identify Bank which is enjoying the four-
month grace period, because Finance Co. should be on the alert for 
security interests on file in state X, where its own interest was recently 
recorded. If Finance Co. took its interest after the collateral was moved 
to state Y, its interest would be second in time and Finance Co. should 
be able to discover Bank's interest by appropriate inquiry of the debtor 
during pre-loan screening. Thus, it seems reasonable to require a fore-
closing junior party to notify even parties with purchase money security 
interests who are enjoying the four-month grace period. 11l9 
Much of this reasoning is subject to the practical objection that 
the debtor may decline to disclose recent movement of the collateral (or 
the debtor's location) in the hope of obtaining financing which might 
otherwise be denied. The risk of debtor dishonesty, however, is one that 
most secured parties assume to some extent. Code rules should not be 
because of the notice provision of U.C.C., § 9-312(3)(b) (1978) and is likely to have discovered 
the junior interest through the pre-credit screening process. 
156. See U.C.C. § 9-312(4) (1978) w~ich provides: "A purchase money security interest in 
collateral other than inventory has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collat-
eral or its proceeds if the pur~hase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor 
receives possession of the collateral or within ten days thereafter." 
157. See supra note 145. 
158. Of course, if Bank took its interest after collateral was moved to state Y, a search of 
the files of state Y should reveal Bank's interest. 
159. If a senior party forecloses its purchase money interest in equipment, it also seems 
reasonable to require it to notify junior parties enjoying the four-month grace period. If the junior 
and senior interests were both initially recorded in state X, then a senior party who forecloses on 
collateral moved to state Y should be on the alert to check the files of state X. If the senior party 
took its interest after the collateral was moved to state Y, and therefore never filed in state X, the 
senior party would be second in time and so could have discovered the recent movement of the 
debtor's equipment through appropriate pre-loan inquiry of its debtor. 
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framed to protect secured parties against their own unfortunate choice 
of a debtor. A foreclosing party who suspects that its debtor may have 
. been motivated to compromise its integrity during loan negotiations 
could inquire again at the time of repossession in the hope that some 
incentive for dishonesty had been removed. ISO A party with serious 
doubts regarding the honesty of its debtor could check the files in every 
state in which it had reason to suspect either the collateral or the 
debtor had recently been located. As a last resort, a foreclosing party 
could simply delay four months before selling the collateral. 
Policy considerations also support requiring a foreclosing party to 
discover and notify secured parties enjoying the four-month grace pe-
riod .. Such a rule honors the Code decision temporarily to protect a 
secured' party whose collateral has moved or whose debtor has relo-
cated. To condition a secured party's right to notice on swift reperfec-
tion would be inconsistent with both the spirit and the letter of section 
9-103, which allows reperfection within four months-a period that is 
not necessarily swift. On balance, it seems reasonable to require a fore-
closing junior party to notify even those secured parties who have filed 
financing statements in states from which the debtor or the collateral 
recently moved. 
Even a modified version of the 1962 notice rule, requiring some-
thing less than a search in all states, may burden foreclosing parties. 
As a practical matter, the costs of searching the record in even a single 
state may be significant. Arranging an expeditious search in another 
state by either public officials or private parties may be especially prob-
lematic. ISI Difficulties are aggravated by the Code's provision for notice 
filing/ s2 which invites broadly worded financing statements, thus some-
times making the collateral difficult to identify. 
Because a search requirement would apply to all foreclosing par-
ties, parties with purchase money security interests in equipment could 
be expected to complain again about the unfairness of requiring them 
to search records at the time of foreclosure when they were not re-
quired to do so at the inception of the transaction. Is3 To exempt these 
160. One may suspect, however, that the debtor may be disinclined to cooperate with the 
repossessor who has recently taken its property. 
161. This difficulty is largely a product of the primitive state of the filing system in this 
country. Much can be learned from our Canadian neighbors who have established a central regis-
try. See Cuming, Computerization of Personal Property Security Registries: What the Canadian 
Experience Presages for the United States, 23 U.C.c. L.J. 331 (1991). 
162. See U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1978). 
163. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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parties from the notice requirement, however, would complicate the 
Code's simple foreclosure rules, would invite uncertainty, and would 
generate disputes over the nature of a security interest, the classifica-
tion of collateral, and other issues once irrelevant to the duties of a 
foreclosing party. This seems a costly price for relieving some foreclos-
ing parties of a duty to access the Code's filing system. 
On balance, the benefits of providing notice to all parties in the 
smoothest and most efficient way outweigh the cost of requiring every 
foreclosing party to search the records prior to sale. 
The notice requirement outlined above could be enforced through 
Code rules already in place. A junior party's improper failure to inform 
a senior party would trigger section 9-507(1). That section gives an 
unnotified party the right to recover any loss caused by a violation of 
the default rules. 164 In appropriate cases, the senior party could be 
given a first priority in proceeds of the junior sale. While ensuring no-
. tice is an essential step, it does not resolve the issue of entitlement to 
sale proceeds. 
B . .. The Proceeds Problem 
Notice to a senior party of a junior foreclosure sale is the linchpin 
of any default sale scheme. As long as all secured parties are notified of 
a junior sale, a predictable and equitable proceeds rule is not difficult to 
fashion. 
As an initial matter, if a debtor has defaulted on the senior inter-
est, the senior party should have a right to intervene by repossessing 
the collateral from a junior party and conduc;ting its own sale. Preemp-
tion seems a logical extension of the senior party's priority and would 
allow a senior party to avoid any sale it deemed inimical to its interests. 
Because the junior party has only a subordinate interest in the collat-
eral, it seems reasonable to relegate to it a subordinate right to repos-
sess the collateral. If the senior party preempts the junior party and 
conducts its own sale, the junior party should have a subordinate right 
to proceeds of the senior sale. 
164. U.c.c. § 9-507(1) (1978) provides in pertinent part: 
If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Part-disposition may be ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and condi-
tions. If the disposition has occurred the debtor or any person entitled to notification or 
whose security interest has been made known to the secured party prior to the disposition 
has a right to recover from the' secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with 
the provisions of this Part. . 
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In fairness to the junior party, however, the senior party should be 
required to exercise its right to repossess within a reasonable time, e.g., 
thirty days after receiving notice of the planned junior sale. Such a 
limitation would protect the junior party against an eleventh-hour sur-
prise after it has made foreclosure arrangements. 
A senior party who declined to exercise its right to repossess the 
collateral would have several options. It could attempt to avoid the ne-
cessity of a sale by curing the debtor's default on the junior loan; it 
could buy the collateral at the junior sale; or it could await its remedy 
against the collateral after sale. A senior. party given these options 
could hardly complain that it has been unfairly prejudiced by a junior 
sale. 
If a junior party' conducts the sale, it should have a first claim to 
sale proceeds (after payment of reasonable expenses of sale) without 
being required to account to the senior party. The junior interest would 
be discharged by the sale, but the senior interest would continue in the 
collateral after sale. This proceeds distribution scheme, however, should 
not apply to cases in which a junior party forecloses by collecting ac-
counts, chattel paper, or instruments. In these cases, proceeds should be 
applied in the order of priority.161! 
One alternative approach deserves mention. Steps could be taken 
to ensure that a purchaser at a junior foreclosure receives pre-sale no-
tice of the senior interest in the collateral. This end' could most easily 
be achieved by requiring the junior party, who should be aware of the 
senior interest, to notify prospective purchasers. 
A purchaser at a junior sale with notice of a senior interest in the 
collateral would presumably adjust its bid to take account of the senior 
interest. At leas't in a well-ordered world, the purchase price reflects the 
extent of the right purchased, i.e., whether the collateral is subject to 
any interests not discharged by the sale. A purchaser who was aware of 
a senior interest, could hardly complain after sale that it has been 
prejudiced by continuation of the senior interest in the collateral. 
However, a purchaser for value whom the junior party failed to 
notify of the senior interest prior to sale, and who otherwise lacked that 
knowledge, could be allowed to take the collateral fre~ of the senior 
interest.166 The senior party could, of course, protect against .this even-
165. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text. 
166. See Byrne, Murphy & Vukowich, supra note 6, at 1926-31 (generally advocating dis-
charge of the interests of senior creditors, whether or not notified, upon a junior sale as a method 
of encouraging senior creditor involvement and eliminating the risks of uncertain title). 
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tuality by ensuring that prospective purchasers receive notice of the 
senior interest. ls7 Such a rule would further the general Code theme of 
protection for innocent purchasers. ISS Instead of an action against the 
collateral held by an innocent purchaser, the senior party would be re-
quired to proceed against the more culpable junior party, who likely 
obtained a higher purchase price because of failure to disclose the sen-
ior interest. A senior interest would have priority in the proceeds of the 
junior sale,ls9 and to the extent such proceeds are insufficient or un-
available, against the junior party personally.l7O 
The problem with this approach is that it strips the senior party of 
an important propri(:tary right and compromises the senior party's abil-
ity to recover its interest. A right to proceeds or a personal cause of 
action against an unscrupulous junior party is hardly an adequate sub-
stitute for a' security interest in collateral. Especially in cases where a 
junior party improperly fails to notify a senior party, this result would 
be untenable. A more appropriate remedy for a disappointed purchaser 
would be either an action to rescind the sale or an action to recover 
damages against the foreclosing junior party. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Section 9-504, the core of the Code rules on default sales, has been 
a source of confusion and concern: This section allows a junior secured 
party to repossess and sell collateral without notifying a senior secured 
party and further allows a junior party to retain sale .proceeds without 
accounting to a senior party. Various courts and commentators have 
struggled either to justify this scenario or to alter it by relying on the 
Code's conflicting general priority sections. The best solution would be 
to amend section 9-504 ~o require a foreclosing party to notify all se-
cured parties whose interests are on file in the state in which the fore-
closing party would be required to file a financing statement on the 
date of repossession, or who are on file in another state and are en-
167. This option assumes that the senior party itself has notice of the junior sale. 
168. Protection for the good faith purchaser probably is the most pervasive concept in the 
Code. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-403( I) (1978) (protecting good faith purchaser of goods); U.C.e. 
§ 2-403(2) (1978) (protecting buyer of goods in ordinary course of business); U.C.C. § 3-305 
(1978) (protecting holder in due course of commercial paper); U.e.e. § 7-502 (1978) (protecting 
holder of duly negotiated document of title); U.C.C. § 9-307 (1978) (protecting buyer of goods in 
ordinary course of business against security interests in certain circumstances). 
169. The senior party would have a right against the debtor for any deficiency. U.C.C. § 9-
504(2) (1978). 
170. See Byrne, Murphy & Vukowich, supra note 6, at 1929. 
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joying the four-month grace period for reperfection under section 9-
103(1)(d) or (3)(e). This change should eliminate the problem of the 
uninformed senior party. 
Additionally, section 9-504 should be amended to clearly authorize 
. a senior party whose interest is.in default to repossess collateral from a 
junior party and to conduct the sale itself. A senior party should be 
required to act within a. reasonable time after receiving notice of a jun-
ior foreclosure sale. If a senior party chose not to intervene, the junior 
party should be allowed to sell the collateral and retain sale proceeds 
without accounting to the senior party. 
In order to clarify the junior party's first right to proceeds of its 
sale, sections 9-504(1) and 9-306(2) should be amended to ·remove any 
implication that the proceeds rule of section 9-306(2) applies to default 
sales. After a junior foreclosure, the senior security interest would fol-
low the collateral into the hands of the purchaser. If, however, the jun-
ior party forecloses by collecting accounts, chattel paper, or instru-
ments, the senior party should take a first right to proceeds of the 
junior foreclosure. 
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